## **EXHIBIT**

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Declaration of Peter C. Salerno In Support of Defendant Yassin Kadi's Motion To Exclude the Testimony of Victor Comras

03 MDL 1570

July 31, 2023

Case 1:03-mg 215-9-GBD-SN Document 9256-25 Filed 08/01/23 Page 2 of 19

Exhibit 0989

The Charitable Ci

# The Charitable Crescent

ne Muslim World

Jonatha and John o Edilon-Jo





Jonathan Benthall and Jérôme Bellion-Jourdan

#### RESCENT

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#### WESTERN VERSUS ISLAMIC AID?\*

### International Muslim charities and humanitarian aid in Sudan

The missionaries in Africa have brandished the motto that says "Give up the religion of Islam, and we will free you from hunger, poverty, fear and sickness" ... Armies of missionaries have crossed Africa with food in their left hands and crosses in their right hands." It was in these terms that the Sudanese organization Da'wa Islamiya depicted, in its 1995 report of 15 years of activities, the missionary danger, in order to justify the activity of da'wa, the call to Islam. The play of events in Sudan has strikingly illustrated the relationship between the politics of aid and the religious question. Since the end of the 1970s, the country has been the victim of serious humanitarian crises': it has been a refuge for the crowds of exiles who have fled from neighbouring countries at war, but it has also been at war itself since the resumption in 1983 of hostilities between the Southern Sudanese rebels – principally, the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) – and the government in the North.

Before going on to analyse the question of aid in Sudan, we must dispose of two misunderstandings that have a wide currency. The first is that it was after the coup by Omar al-Bashir in June 1989, and the setting up of an Islamist regime directed by Hassan al-Turabi, that the Islamic question emerged as central to political debates in Sudan. On the contrary, Islam had had a strong presence in Sudanese politics since the nineteenth century, when the Khatmiya and the Mahdi movement had been rivals in the mobilization of religious symbolism for political ends. The Khatmiya was an order founded by Muhamad Osman al-Mirghani (1793-1853), inspired by the teaching of the Idrissiya order of the Hijaz in Arabia. This order, which supported the Turko-Egyptian regime, actively opposed the Mahdist revolutionary movement, ppening up a political rivalry that was slow to burn out. The Mahdist movement also dates back to the nineteenth century. Muhamad Ahmad al-Mahdi, who came from a family belonging to the Samaniya fraternity, launched a revolutionary movement against British rule in 1881, and developed an autonomous movement of ansar (as in

the 'helpers' of the Prophet Muhammad in Medina) or partisans. Since the 1950s and 60s, forms of political Islam evolved to build influence on the credit of these movements with their strong roots in the society.

The other misunderstanding is to characterize the war as simply one between the Muslim North and the Christian and animist South. First, while it is true that the various parties to the conflict make use of a rhetoric that borrows from religion (Hassan and Gray 2002), we must not forger the material motivations that have generated and fed the conflict, especially the desire to control the petroleum resources in the South. Second, strategic alliances and political manœuvres to seek a solution to the conflict show that self-interest can often win out over ideological considerations. Let us remember that one of the reasons for the arrest of the Islamist leader, Hassan al-Turabi, in February 2001, on the orders of his former ally, President al-Bashir, was that he had signed a memorandum with the Southern rebels calling for a lasting solution to the conflict and the 'constitution of a new society which would not allow the discrimination between citizens on the basis of religion, culture, ethnicity, gender or region'.<sup>2</sup>

As will be shown, the question of aid is at stake because its exploitation is mutually suspected by both sides of conveying elements of a religious idea, indeed a religious ideology used for political aims. In Northern Sudan especially, Islamist denunciations of 'Christian' or 'Western' intentions — the two are sometimes conflated — have been used to support a strong investment in the alternative arrangements of an 'Islamic' aid. But these elements of ideological mobilization should not be allowed to mask the fact that all parties to the conflict are capable of a pragmatic attitude.

#### The Islamist denunciation of the missionary past

A study by a Sudanese author, Hassan Makki, of the influence of the missionary factor on the political and cultural integration of the Sudan, indicates the elements that are taken up in the Islamist critique of humanitarianism. Published by the UKbased Islamic Foundation, which is close to the Pakistani Islamist movement Jama'at i-Islami, this analysis of missionary activities from 1843 to 1986 leaves no room for doubt about the reality of a 'Christian design' on Southern Sudan. According to Makki, Christian missionary organizations were traditionally abettors of the policy of Western influence over the Sudan. This was already so at the end of the nineteenth century, in the campaign against the Mahdi's revivalist movement: the Catholic mission in the Sudan provided a channel for foreigners to have arms conveyed in order to defeat Mahdism. This author likens the activities of these missionaries to the Crusaders, for they allowed the European powers to put the last touches to their preparations for the conquest of the Muslim state of the Sudar. (Makki 1989: 31-2). According to Makki, the Catholic missionaries, considered as agents of European powers, facilitated the British tutelage of the Sudan, which was formalized by the setting up of an Anglo-Egyptian condominium in 1899.

Makki claims that the link between missionary and political projects continued into the twentieth century. Under the Condominium, missionary activities intensified in the South; for instance, a cathedral was built in Juba in 1920 which became the headquarters of the Gordon Memorial Southern Sudan Mission (ib.: 60f.). Seeds of conflict were sown which were to explode between the South and the North after

Sudan became independent in missionary education was releable to the discontrol of missionary education was releable to the discontrol of missionary education in the discontinued, the activity of missionary education of the form Christianity or Western seculari-Interviewed in 1996 in Khartoum translation in the African International annalized with pride the pionee conception of an international annancial institutions and business

The development of an Islamis
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missionary record in Sudan wou nevitably selective, but the poin aunching of counter-programme expansion of Islam, and the local methods have been used to ensur During the 1960s and 70s, the e reginning of the 80s, the strategy v is not to leave African popu reanizations. But as we shall se poosing Western projects did n impetition among Muslim organi Li not stand up to a reality that wa Investment in charitable organi renetration, but not the only one. faternities in order to mainta lasser built up close links wit entrenched in west Africa and who everal times in Cairo.4 It has bee


From the 1960s onwards, Saudifrourable to itself on the African nsidered an 'Islamic frontier', the finance was particularly manifest faction and da'wa, and in the statutions (Constantin 1993: 48-53 Another step to further the inter-Shartoum of an African Islamic

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political projects continuesionary activities intensified in 1920 which became the Mission (ib.: 60f.). Seeds of South and the North after Sudan became independent in 1956. The elite that had been created by Christian missionary education was relegated to second place in independent Sudan, and became a critical factor in the dispute with the North which led to the conflict. After independence, the activity of missionary societies was controlled by the Missionary Societies Act of 1962. But Makki contends that Western and Christian influence has continued, this time in the form of NGOs – aid being used as a weapon to impose Christianity or Western secularism on the populations of South Sudan (ib.: 117). Interviewed in 1996 in Khartoum, where he was director of a centre for research and translation in the African International University, the author of *The Christian Design* emphasized this historical perspective on the emergence of the Islamic NGOs. He recalled with pride the pioneering role of the Islamic Relief Agency in the conception of an international activity of 'Islamic relief' connected to a system of financial institutions and businesses.<sup>3</sup>

#### The development of an Islamist alternative to meet Christian competition

The historical reality is no doubt more complex than the above picture of the missionary record in Sudan would indicate. Memories of the missionary past are inevitably selective, but the point here is that they have been used to justify the launching of counter-programmes. Africa is considered a strategic zone for the expansion of Islam, and the location of Sudan is especially important. Different methods have been used to ensure the Muslim presence on the African continent. During the 1960s and 70s, the emphasis was on education and da'na. From the beginning of the 80s, the strategy was adopted of penetrating the charitable sector so as not to leave African populations exclusively in the hands of Western organizations. But as we shall see, the relative consensus over the necessity of opposing Western projects did not lead to any unity of action, but resulted in competition among Muslim organizations: appeals to the principle of unity (tanhid) did not stand up to a reality that was fashioned by rival ambitions.

Investment in charitable organizations was one means towards this competitive penetration, but not the only one. In the 1960s, some states supported networks of Sufi fraternities in order to maintain influence in Africa; for instance, Egypt under Nasser built up close links with the Tijaniya fraternity, which was strongly entrenched in west Africa and whose leader, Ibrahim Niasse, was received by Nasser several times in Cairo. It has been suggested that this link enabled the Egyptian president to increase his popularity in west Africa. In order not to be left out, and although its Wahhabi ideology was opposed to Sufi Islam, the Saudi state also supported these networks through offering educational and research bursaries (Kane 1997: 55-6).

From the 1960s onwards, Saudi-Arabia was active in seeking to develop networks favourable to itself on the African continent, particularly in East Africa, which was considered an 'Islamic frontier', the limit of the *umma* (Brenner 1993: 15). The Saudi influence was particularly manifest in the activities of the World Islamic League in education and *da'wa*, and in the support given to launching a number of Islamic institutions (Constantin 1993: 48-53).

Another step to further the interests of the Gulf States was the founding in 1967 in Khartoum of an African Islamic Centre, designed to mould an African elite as a counterweight to the Westernized or Christianized elites. Its activity was interrupted

after the coup which brought Jaafar Numayri to power in May 1969, but it was reopened in 1971 under the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Property, and then in 1972 turned into the Institute of Islamic Education. With a headquarters ten kilometres south of Khartoum, it was funded by Saudi-Arabia Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Sudan and Morocco. In 1977, E. centre welcomed about sixty students from Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda and Sudabut by 1987 the number had risen to 780. Meanwhile, the centre built up first departments: education, da'wa (from 1980), research and publications (from 1951 and social services - the last-named of which was responsible for material aid : various Islamic institutions in Africa. After the coup of June 1989, the new regim. decided, as part of a reform of education, to turn the centre into the International African University (Grandin 1993). When I visited it in 1996, the university was sta very active and full of students from all over the African continent. Many receivesupport from Islamic organizations such as Da'wa Islamiya. According to  $\pm$ employee, it supported the university financially and enabled African students: attend by providing them with flight tickets, housing and monthly scholarships.<sup>5</sup>

#### Da'wa Islamiya and the Islamic African Relief Agency

Gradually the charitable sector was penetrated. The idea was to combine support for African Muslim populations with da wa. The Islamic African Relief Agency (IARE was started as a branch of the Organization for the Islamic Call (munazamat ad-da al-Islamiya or MDI) in Sudan. These two organizations were to play a very active reason the African continent, contributing to an increasing presence of Islamic NGOs of Africa, and thus to what Salih has called the 'promise and peril of Islamic voluntarism' (Salih 2003). The founding of IARA illustrates how 'Islamic relief' with initially thought of as part of a broader project of commitment to Islamic renewal through da wa — a project which has provoked strong competition both at the national and the international levels. The decision to found Da wa Islamiya with taken at an international conference on da wa organized in Khartoum in 1980 at the invitation of Jaafar Nimayri, who was keen to give his regime some Islamic legitimacy. This conference agreed to the creation of an organization to specialize of the call to Islam on the African continent.

The aims for which it was launched in May 1980 were to work towards 'the propagation of Islam as faith ['aqida] and as law [shari'a] in non-Muslim communities' and 'the emancipation of Muslim communities that are capable is understanding the doctrine of tawhid [the unity of God] and the expression of its deep meanings for individual and social life'. Da'wa is thus the act of preaching bet to Muslims who are enjoined to rejoin the path of 'true Islam' and to non-Muslim-who are invited to convert. The Arabic-language publications of the organization leave no doubt about the matter. Thus, the image of the muhtadi [convert, i.e. 'right-guided'] occupies a central place: in its newsletter, Al-risala [the message], the agent has been keeping an annual count of the number of converts, accompanied by qistamuhtadiyya, testimonies which underline the strictly voluntary character of conversion to Islam. As El-Affendi puts it, the reasoning behind these organizations was that Christian missionaries had used education and humanitarian aid to 'subvert' African Muslims, and it was therefore essential to give Africans an alternative which would

Inistianity (El-Affendi 1990: 280).

Da'wa Islamiya's head office is immension. Initially, its support came: name to develop for the most part out its directorate in 1982. Alongsic inspresentatives of Gulf States (Saudinther from ministries or from Islamic the service of the foreign policies of Da'wa Islamiya were the secretary essistant, the former secretary-general Tawfiq al-Qasir, a professor at the lawaiti agency Beit uz-Zakat.

The agency's funding followed a tetween Libya and the providers of September Revolution' of 1969 that a teen seeking to extend its influence Tasses') had its own agencies for the resed in Tripoli (Otayek 1986). The : sportunity to extend its influence, ar Li wa Islamiya in Tripoli, towards the This Libyan initiative displeased fluence was marginal on the Africa: regemonic projects of the conservation evolutionary aspect of the Libyan pr most of all Saudi-Arabia. Gadaffi': is and Western countries, and was. <sup>37</sup>). In this context, Saudi-Arabia – : ternal relations - was considered a Esi Sea region from Soviet influence. ain of Iran in the Persian Gulf. In accement to meet the challenge of I and Saudi-Arabia (Otayek 198. teame was in danger of entering Tinopolizing Islamic legitimacy in the other African countries. The Sau aid use Da`wa Islamiya to increase

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Fery rapidly, the providers of financing of the activities of Da'wa I sanguish different types of investoration:10

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not allow the missionaries to exploit African poverty and thus to 'impose' Christianity (El-Affendi 1990: 280).

Da'wa Islamiya's head office is in Khartoum, but it has an international dimension. Initially, its support came mainly from foreign countries, and its activities came to develop for the most part outside Sudan -- as is reflected in the composition of its directorate in 1982. Alongside Sudanese personalities, there were listed representatives of Gulf States (Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, the Emirates), either from ministries or from Islamic institutions which often placed themselves at the service of the foreign policies of host countries. Thus among the directors of Da'wa Islamiya were the secretary-general of the World Islamic League and his assistant, the former secretary-general of the World Assembly of Muslim Youth Tawfiq al-Qasir, a professor at the University of Riyadh) and the head of the Kuwaiti agency Beit uz-Zakat.

The agency's funding followed a similar pattern. An element of rivalry arose between Libya and the providers of funds from the Gulf. Since the 'First of September Revolution' of 1969 that brought Muamar Gadaffi to power, Libya had been seeking to extend its influence in Africa. The Libyan *jamahiriya* ('state of the masses') had its own agencies for this purpose, such as Jami'yyat Da'wa Islamiya, based in 'Tripoli (Otayek 1986). The Sudanese Da'wa Islamiya seemed to Libya an apportunity to extend its influence, and so it was helped by support from Jami'yyat Da'wa Islamiya in Tripoli, towards the building of its headquarters in Khartoum.8

This Libyan initiative displeased the Gulf governments. At the time, Iranian influence was marginal on the African continent and provided no challenge to the negemonic projects of the conservative Gulf states (Chouet 1994). By contrast, the revolutionary aspect of the Libyan programme worried these conservative regimes and most of all Saudi-Arabia. Gadaffi's Libya had established some distance between rself and Western countries, and was aligning itself with the Soviet Union (El-Kikhia 1997). In this context, Saudi-Arabia - anti-communist and making use of Islam in its external relations - was considered a guarantor of Western interests to protect the Red Sea region from Soviet influence, just as the Western powers also relied on the Shah of Iran in the Persian Gulf. In 1976, after the attempted coup in Sudan, an agreement to meet the challenge of Libyan subversion was signed between Sudan, Egypt and Saudi-Arabia (Otayek 1983: 10). The Islamic orientation of the Libyan regime was in danger of entering a competition with the Saudi ambition of monopolizing Islamic legitimacy in the world of Sunni Islam, which included Sudan and other African countries. The Saudi authorities were specially afraid that Libya would use Da'wa Islamiya to increase its influence in Chad, and so sought to outbid :: financially.9

Very rapidly, the providers of funds from the Gulf came to dominate the financing of the activities of Da'wa Islamiya. The report for 1981-9 enables us to distinguish different types of investor who funded its operating programmes in Sudan: 10

States: the United Arab Emirates, which financed the building of a mosque at the Ministry of Higher Education, and another in the military camp of the ma'qil [fort] at Shendi in the north; the state of Kuwait – for the As-Sabah hospital for children at Juba, and a mosque at Wau.

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Ministers of governments in their private capacities. Sheikh Khaled Ban Hamad al-Thar-Minister of the Interior for Qatar – an irrigation project at Omdurman.

Companies: the Ben Laden Foundation - 'six Ben Laden schools' in the North and Khartoum at a cost of \$600,000.

Businessmen and financiers: the Saudi, Sheikh Saleh Kamel – reconstruction of schools for \$700,000; Sheikh Tariq Ben Laden, also Saudi – 'Ben Laden wells' in the Ramarea of the High Nile.

Islamic banks: the Islamic Development Bank – a hospital at Luwa, secondary school for Erithrean refugees in the East of Sudan.

Other Islamic institutions: the World Islamic League – the fitting out of the As-Satur-Hospital at Juba, funded by Kuwait; the Kuwaiti Beit uz-Zakat – the 'Kuwaiti maternity centre' at Mayo, mosques in the Nuba mountains, and clinics and other services for displaced populations.

Charitable institutions: the International Islamic Charitable Organization (Kuwait - - mosque in the village of Abu Ju in Jezira; the Africa Muslim Agency - two mosque:

The 1991 report, which also includes Da'wa Islamiya's programmes outside Samon confirms the predominance of finance from the Gulf, as well as the vanta different sources. This predominance might lead us to conclude that it was organization controlled by the Gulf states. This conclusion however would take granted the assumption that local agencies have no room for manoeuvre in the Facility of the Gulf states.

Da'wa Islamiya in the Sudanese domestic scene: control by the Islamists The case of Da'wa Islamiya in Sudan shows that such an assumption is written was indeed a tool of the Gulf states in pursuit of influence in Africa. But graduate to be diverted from its initial objective to become one of the instrument local political movement which sought to take power: the tendency led by Hassar Turabi within the Sudanese Islamist movement.

By contrast with other countries in the Middle East, in Sudan it was with political environment dominated by religious references that contemporary for Islamism developed. Popular' forms of Islam have had a marked influence in State It has been argued that this was one of the factors which explains why the grant the Muslim Brothers movement from the 1940s to the 1960s was slow Islamia 1992).

A new form of Islamism did develop slowly, partly on account of contact: the Muslim Brothers of Egypt in 1944-5, when Sudan was still under the Egyptian condominium. Periods of multi-party politics were favourable growth of the movement (Niblock 1991). The foundation of the Islamic Grant Front (jebha al-mithaq al-islami) in 1964 marked the entry on the stage of Hassin Turabi. In the 1970s, he began to oppose the traditional orientation of the Sudan Muslim Brothers, led by Al-Sadiq Abd al-Majid, and this rupture was formalised by al-Turabi.

After Nimayri's coup in 1969, the opposition was severely repressed, and confficials such as Turabi were imprisoned. Others sought refuge abroad, included al-Mahdi, leader of the Umma party, who was welcomed in Libya in personal friend, Muamar Gadaffi (Otayek 1986: 40f.). The militant Islamists took the path of exile took advantage of this period to build up contact

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Then Nimayri proposed a policy of inmists seized the opportunity of this turtual scene. On their side, after the amount, the Mahdists played the game trastful. The leader of the Islamic C agreed to assume some political respirates of justice. This period was also before society. Contacts made during tradate investment in Sudan.

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Sheikh Khaled Ban Hamad al-Thani, project at Orndurman.

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- was severely repressed, and certainers sought refuge abroad, including the was welcomed in Libya by his 40f.). The militant Islamists who period to build up contacts and

overseas networks, for instance in import/export businesses, as potential support for later political activity.

When Nimayri proposed a policy of 'national reconciliation' on 27 May 1977, the Islamists seized the opportunity of this turning-point to play a role on the Sudanese political scene. On their side, after the return of their leader Sadiq al-Mahdi to Khartoum, the Mahdists played the game for a time, while the Khatmiya remained mistrustful. The leader of the Islamic Charter Front, Hassan al-Turabi, was freed and agreed to assume some political responsibilities, then became attorney-general, in charge of justice. This period was also utilized to establish Islamic institutions in Sudanese society. Contacts made during the period of exile were mobilized to stimulate investment in Sudan.

There grew up an Islamic economic sector including banks and investment houses. One of these was the Faysal Islamic Bank, founded in May 1978 in Khartoum, of which a large minority stake was owned by Prince Muhamad Bin Faysal, the Saudi founder of the project and a personal friend of al-Turabi since the beginning of the 70s (Marchal 1995: 20). This bank set up subsidiaries such as the Islamic Insurance Society and the Islamic Investment Society (Ahmed 1997, Medani 1997). The climate was favourable for these institutions to flourish, for the Nimayri regime announced the application of shari'a in September 1983. Then on 9 December of the same year a committee set up by the President announced that no bank was authorized to operate a system of loan interest. The Muslim Brothers' control over economic institutions provoked the hostility of the Khatmiya, whose rich traders reacted to the success of the Faysal Islamic Bank by setting up in 1982 the Sudanese Islamic Bank in order to keep their monopoly over retail commerce Tbrahim 1992: 45-9).

When Da'wa Islamiya was launched, various Sudanese political elements drawing their legitimacy from Islam sought to benefit from the organization's activities. Much was at stake. It was in fact a composite entity comprising a variety of institutions that were financially and administratively autonomous. Thus it was active in the investment sector with the Don Fodio Benevolent Foundation for Commerce and Contracting (mu'assassa don fodio ai-khairya lil-tijara w l-muqawalat), which operated in the import-export field and made investments in real estate, timber and textiles. Regarded as a 'welfare company', it was exempt from tax. The Don Fodio Foundation invested in Kenya, Nigeria and other foreign countries, as well as in Sudan, and it contributed 20 per cent to Da'wa Islamiya's budget. 12

Da'wa Islamiya also invested in the African Council for Private Education, with schools aimed at the children of rich Sudanese and foreign diplomats in Khartoum; in a centre for research and training in da'wa; in media production studios; <sup>13</sup> and also in charitable works. To begin with, one branch was active in this field, the African Society for the Care of Mothers and Children (which later became independent). In 1981, the Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA – al-wekalat al-islamiya al-ifriqiya lilighatha) was founded.

It soon developed its activities at the international level, initially in many African countries but also in other continents, for instance in Peshawar during the Afghan war, under the name of ISRA. In a Da'wa Islamiya leaflet published in Arabic in 1985, IARA was described as 'the first relief organization of this kind on the African continent, amid an impressive number of foreign and evangelical agencies'. This

agency 'had established in a short time a solid base of Islamic work in this new field for da'wa methods, by means of competence, precision and security in the provision of relief services'. From the beginning, then, relief programmes were explicitly conceived as being subsidiary to preaching.

At the beginning, too, influential members of the Islamist movement were providing a bridge, more or less officially, between the planning of da'wa and the political project. Thus Mohamed Abd Allah Jar al-Nabi, believed to be a princip funder of the Sudanese Islamist movement, was a member of the African Councafor Private Education. When, in 1986, he opened an office of his company in Sudanit diversified from commerce into construction, and its first project was of a charitable nature. With \$10 million of Kuwaiti financing, his company built the Kuwaiti Village of Compassion (qariat hanan al-kuwaitiya): this project, designed for a thousand children, mainly from Eritrea, was in fact a project of Da'wa Islamiya's. Is

On a political chess-board where the principal parties adopt Islam as a kerallying-point, we must not generalize and assume that all the Sudaness representatives in the hierarchy of Da wa Islamiya were part of the Islamist tendencied by al-Turabi. Other tendencies were represented, such as some businessmen of the Khatmiya and the Ansar al-Sunna al Muhammadiya ('supporters of the Propher Muhammad's 'Tradition', an orthodox group not known for its direct political activism). Moreover, the apparent clarity of political confrontations could be disturbed by the play of interpersonal relations within the elite. The marriage of Khartoum of Hassan al-Turabi, leader of the National Islamic Front (NIF), to Wiselal-Mahdi, sister of Sadiq al-Mahdi, head of the Umma, was a prominent case of a kinship bond which happened to unite two rival political leaders in a way that would not have been predictable otherwise.

Nevertheless, it is true that Islamist officials close to the al-Turabi tendency were specially numerous in the managing board of Da'wa Islamiya. One was Ahmee Mahjub Haj Nur, one of the three judges presiding at the appeal court in Khartoum who decided in 1985 on the death penalty for apostasy of Mahmud Muhammae Taha, the leading intellectual and leader of the Republican Brothers. Taha, who had founded the Republican Party in 1945 calling for the independence of Sudan, had developed a spiritual, non-political reading of Islam, which remains today an inspiration for many young educated Sudanese. <sup>16</sup>

Signs of growing control over Da'wa Islamiya by the Islamists multiplied during the 80s, and provoked some reactions. Da'wa Islamiya became an issue in the domestic political conflict: when Nimayri turned against the Islamists in 1984. conscious as he was of the influence that they had acquired over the workings of power and authority, some employees of Da'wa Islamiya were arrested. When interviewed in 1996, the executive director of the organization recognized that Nimayri's action had had a political aim: 'At the beginning of the 80s, there was no multi-party system. ... When the Nimayri regime tried to outlaw the organization, is was a political act. But it hurt a few people who were sent to prison, not the activities of the organization as a whole'. The regime collapsed in 1985 before the organization could be outlawed.

Nimayri's successor was Swar al-Dahab, who led the Transitional Military Councebetween 1985 and 1986 towards a new period of multi-party politics. Jazuli Dafallam president of the Doctors' Union, then became first minister in an interim

government (Holt and Daly both men moved from the suppointed president of Daly me Islamic African Relief appointment is unsurprising. Brothers, which became public 1983.

As for Swar al-Dahab, his appears that when he we Islamists proposed a deal to I they would give him the post but also of material significa some \$30,000 per month, in has been given however by 2 Returning from his exile in I the autumn of 2000, the fo criticizes Swar al-Dahab, wh Esparture for the United Sta are of to effect a coup. Nima he had also appointed him version of the facts is true, b the directorship of Da'wa Isl the number two position in Relief (see p.75), founded : Islamiya was more and more letermine how much real cor

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the Transitional Military Councilulti-party politics. Jazuli Dafallah. e first minister in an interim

government (Holt and Daly 1988: 217-225). Once their missions were carried out, both men moved from the sphere of politics to that of charity. Swar al-Dahab was appointed president of Da'wa Islamiva, and Jazuli Dafallah honorary president of the Islamic African Relief Agency. A simple calendrical coincidence? Dafallah's appointment is unsurprising, in that he was known for his closeness to the Muslim Brothers, which became public when he openly supported the Islamic laws adopted in 1983.

As for Swar al-Dahab, his career is more surprising. Coming from the Khatmiya, it appears that when he was president of the Transitional Military Council, the Islamists proposed a deal to him. If he would not abrogate the Islamic laws of 1983, they would give him the post of president of Da'wa Islamiya, which was prestigious but also of material significance. Certain sources suggest that the honorarium was some \$30,000 per month, in addition to the use of an official car. A different version has been given however by Nimavri himself, in an interview published in Al-Wasat. 18 Returning from his exile in Egypt to take part in presidential elections in Sudan in the autumn of 2000, the former president of Sudan is settling scores. He openly criticizes Swar al-Dahab, whom he had named Minister of Defence just before his departure for the United States for medical consultations, which the minister made use of to effect a coup. Nimayri calls Swar al-Dahab a coward (jaban) and claims that he had also appointed him as 'the head of the Islamic relief agency'. Whichever version of the facts is true, both are evidence of the strategic and coveted status of the directorship of Da'wa Islamiya - a position which also allowed al-Dahab to take the number two position in the Cairo-based World Islamic Council for Da'wa and Relief (see p.75), founded in 1988 and headed by the Sheikh Al-Azhar. Da'wa Islamiva was more and more at the heart of the political battle, even if it is hard to determine how much real control of the organization was exercised by the Islamists.

When the leader of the Umma party, Sadiq al-Mahdi, became prime minister in 1986, the Islamists of the NIF, led by al-Turabi, strengthened by their relative electoral success, claimed a share of power and set their conditions.<sup>19</sup> A new power struggle set in, between Da'wa Islamiya and the government, dominated by the Umma party. Sadiq al-Mahdi had welcomed the foundation of the agency: during the Nimavri period, he had taken part in meetings of its managing board, and considered it a means to attract external Arab finance to counterbalance the influence of Western NGOs in dealing with Sudan's humanitarian problems. Some years later, Da'wa Islamiya was treated by Sadiq al-Mahdi as an instrument in the service of the competing Islamist party, the NIF. 'We took a negative attitude', said the head of the Umma party in an interview in Khartoum in May 1996, 'when we noticed that they were not sincere in their humanitarian activities, using the resources for the purposes of the political confrontation'.20 The attorney-general outlawed the organization in 1986, but its jurists were successful in having the decision annulled for want of legal proof. Was it the Umma party's aim in doing this to destabilize the NIF? In 1996, at a meeting at his house in Omdurman, Sadiq al-Mahdi acknowledged this readily and said he regretted having failed to do so. Did the Umma party have its sights set on Da'wa Islamiya? That is what the secretarygeneral of the organization asserted: he suspected the Umma party of having seen in the agency 'a type of popular activity that could be useful to it' for domestic political ends, and that the other political side, the NIF, should not benefit from. According

to Dr Al-Amin, the Umma party had been trying 'to get its hands' on ever organization in Sudan. $^{21}$ 

International to begin with, Da'wa Islamiya came more and more to be thought of as an instrument of the NIF's on the domestic political scene in Sudan – which obviously upset the other political formations. Ironically, the agency's leaders replact to criticisms – both from the Nimayri and the Sadiq al-Mahdi regimes – precisely a emphasizing that the international character of the organization was proof that could not be the tool of any domestic political agenda. In an interview published a Sudanow in 1985, Mubarak Qasmallah, its director, stated that

the agency is not part of the Muslim Brothers at all. It is an international agency belonging to all Muslims, wherever they are and whatever their political orientation. Thus, what Nimayri did surprised me deeply, because it was he who, in 1980, exerted himself to convince the conference members that its headquarters should be in Sudan. ... All the funding comes from outside Sudan.<sup>22</sup>

In reality, the external funding did not mean that the agency's policies derives from a truly international dimension: the process of 'NIFization' of the agency which began in the 1980s was reinforced after the June 1989 coup which brought Omar al-Bashir to power.

The initial project of da'wa was far from disappearing; but the power struge: between those who defined Da'wa Islamiya's policies was moving on. Externinvestment in the service of da'wa in Africa was channelled by a local political force Displaced from power by the 30 June 1989 coup, Sadiq al-Mahdi was free in incriticism of the 'politicization' of the agency – which he had not been able to capture for his own party. Here is what he told me in 1996:

They succeeded in grasping the resources of rich Muslims from Saudi-Arabia and Kuwait ... who considered it a duty to work for the islamization of Sudan's non-Muslims. The NIF appealed to them as follows: 'If you put your resources in our hands, we will be able to convert the non-Muslims of Sudan, and indeed of Africa'. That was the pretext ... for grasping resources which they proceeded to use for another purpose. By politicizing these agencies, they involved them in the political confrontation, at the risk of weakening them and putting their future in doubt.<sup>23</sup>

Thus Da'wa Islamiya gradually became a partisan organization, made use of both in Sudan and in its transnational networks. In the Sudan of the 1980s, it was one means among others to establish the influence of the NIF. And in common with some other organizations, it was clearly seen at the time as an organization in the service of NIF, a true lever of power behind the scenes. Rumour says that it was in the studios of Da'wa Islamiya in the Ryad quarter of Khartoum that the president recorded his first televised address announcing the successful coup.

#### After June 1989: the nation first, or Islamism first?

After the coup by General Omar al-Bashir on 30 June 1989 which overturned Sadial-Mahdi, the new regime's Islamist orientation became clear in the ensuing month: (Marchal 1992, Sidahmed 1997). Even if al-Bashir did not flaunt any sympathy for the Islamists, it turned out to be the men of the NIF in the shadows who held the true reins of the new power. Though he occupied no official position until his

election as parliamentary Speaker eminence' of the new regime. Feople's Conference, with himse Tatform for Islamist and Arab : every effort had to be made to cial welfare sector was critical. the resources that had been mot The are making progress along the Take available enough resources raqf, which are collective assets stem of social welfare' (al-Tura: Samic tradition of good works. make possible a programme of e Titical power.24 The zakat lev. maracterized as jihad in order to ahidin and the casualties marty popular defence forces (Baillar In this context, the denunciation the foreigner served to justify the ini or resources of NGOs or int are name of the defence of Isia Eich threatened Sudan again in r wanting to use international aid

> Some people want to use the drtie our hands. It is preferable that allow the international crusade famine as long as we are an Islan organizations to do what they w Islamic Revolution in the South.

In language less inflamed but s Fieldef Agency (IARA/ISRA), int Atternational NGOs which he ha z Ecy which he wittily described a mass of influence like the Allies ! callysis of Abdallah Suleyman a Erdofan region, Oxfam's was t rth, and World Vision's the sout It would be a mistake to see in amanitarianism, especially when zicate the viewpoint of those wh Tire of a bad turn than a good tu lefence of culture and sovereignty Te service of local strategies to c ther words, the vaunted objecti cencies; but in practice, it was oft the Islamist tendency that were t trying 'to get its hands' on ever-

ame more and more to be thought ic political scene in Sudan – which onically, the agency's leaders replied diq al-Mahdi regimes – precisely be the organization was proof that it tenda. In an interview published by stated that

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e 1989 which overturned Sadic ne clear in the ensuing months d not flaunt any sympathy for in the shadows who held the no official position until his

election as parliamentary Speaker in 1996, Hassan al-Turabi was considered the 'grey eminence' of the new regime. In April 1991, he founded the Arab and Islamic People's Conference, with himself as secretary-general, which was intended to be a platform for Islamist and Arab nationalist movements. For this Islamist ideologue, every effort had to be made to further the 'civilizing' project of islamization. The social welfare sector was critical. In an interview given in 1997, al-Turabi welcomed the resources that had been mobilized to support this policy: Gradually, in Sudan, we are making progress along the road of total islamization. As the state does not make available enough resources for this responsibility to be taken up, zakat and waqf, which are collective assets according to Muslim ideas, allow us to support a system of social welfare' (al-Turabi 1997: 166). These financial levies, justified by the Islamic tradition of good works, would be used to top up state taxation and thus make possible a programme of extensive control of society, and hence of retaining political power.24 The zakat levy would also assist the war effort, a war openly characterized as jihad in order to gain support for it, in which the combatants were mujahidin and the casualties martyrs, a war to be fought both by a regular army and by popular defence forces (Baillard and Haenni 1997: 88, Sidahmed 2002).

In this context, the denunciation of international humanitarian aid as the hand of the foreigner served to justify the maintenance of policies for controlling the work and/or resources of NGOs or international agencies. This denunciation was made in the name of the defence of Islam and/or the nation. At the time of the famine which threatened Sudan again in 1991, al-Turabi castigated those whom he accused of wanting to use international aid to interfere with Sudan's international affairs:

Some people want to use the drop in agricultural production, due to the drought, to tie our hands. It is preferable that several thousands of people should die rather than allow the international crusade to come to our help. ... We will never declare a famine as long as we are an Islamic nation. ... We will never allow international aid organizations to do what they want in our country and to oppose the plans of the Islamic Revolution in the South.<sup>25</sup>

In language less inflamed but similar in content, the president of Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA/ISRA), interviewed in Khartoum in 1996, denounced the international NGOs which he had suspected since the 1980s of contributing to a policy which he wittily described as a 'Sudanese Yalta' – aiming to divide Sudan into zones of influence like the Allies in 1944. According to the deliberately provocative analysis of Abdallah Suleyman al-'Awad, CARE's sphere of influence was the Kordofan region, Oxfam's was the west, ADRA's (Adventist Relief Agency) the north, and World Vision's the south.<sup>26</sup>

It would be a mistake to see in these opinions a hostility to the very principle of humanitarianism, especially when the speaker is head of a relief agency. But they indicate the viewpoint of those who condemned any use of humanitarian aid that did more of a bad turn than a good turn to their own interests. Legitimate arguments, in defence of culture and sovereignty put at risk by humanitarian aid, were deployed in the service of local strategies to control the activities of international agencies. In other words, the vaunted objective was to encourage the activities of Sudanese agencies; but in practice, it was often those agencies, Sudanese or international, near to the Islamist tendency that were the ones to profit from this policy.

After the model of the Missionary Societies Act of 1962 which aimed to control missionary activities, measures to control international NGOs had already been taken under the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi (1986-9). This process intensified after the coming to power of Omar al-Bashir in 1989. When questioned about these measures, Ghazi Salah Eddine Atabani, an influential official in the NIF and these president of the National Congress, defended them by invoking two principles consistent with themes that were being developed on the international scene reaffirming the sovereignty of the state, and showing preference for local organizations.<sup>27</sup>

It was thus in the name of respect for national sovereignty that the Sudaness government laid down conditions for the implementation of Operation Lifelin: Sudan (OLS). Set up in April 1989, this was an arrangement supervised by the United Nations for coordinating relief to populations affected by the war that has been fought since 1983 between the government in northern Sudan and retain movements in the South. The arrangement provided for activities in the northern sector being supervised by the authorities in Khartoum, while coordination of cross-frontier activities in the southern sector would be the responsibility of Uniceroffice in Kenya (Karim 1996).

In the same way, it was officially to encourage local organizations that the Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC – a merger in 1996 of the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission and the Commission for Voluntary Agencies) with a precise task of controlling the voluntary organizations operating to Sudan. Thus, the Country Agreement signed in 1993 made the continued operation of international agencies – work permits, import of goods, access to displace-persons' camps – conditional on their forming partnerships by 'twinning' with Sudanese organizations.

If this policy of twinning soon proved unrealistic (Karim 1996: 50 and 97-8), the growth of local organizations, encouraged by the government, showed tanging results. New organizations were founded such as the Foundation for Peace and Development, while existing agencies, particularly Da'wa Islamiya and Islamica African Relief Agency, experienced a new lease of life.

Whether coincidentally or not, the suspicion expressed with regard to the international agencies, especially since 1989, corresponded to an increase in the number of international Islamic relief agencies working in northern Sudan. These included the British-based agencies Islamic Relief and Muslim Aid, the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and Lejnet al-Bir al-Dawliya (Committee for International Charity) from Saudi-Arabia, the Africa Muslim Agency from Kuwait, well as the Muwaffaq al-Kheiriya with its headquarters in Jersey – all of which opened offices in Khartoum and developed programmes in various regions after the beginning of the 1990s. As the executive manager of Muwaffaq al-Kheiriya admittation an interview in 1996, the launch of an office in Khartoum had been facilitated to the authorities: Muwaffaq al-Kheiriya were granted facilities such as a building plot of an office, exemption from customs and taxes, and free transportation of relief to the South. Thus the Islamist critique of international practices of humanitarian and was of benefit to other practices of humanitarian aid – local or international, but Islamist.

Criticisms of Islamist use of In Khartoum, there were ma sometimes by the staff of ir rganizations, which vigorou covernment authorities and Is - Khartoum, Toby Maduot. Society Dinka Rek, painted : governmental policy of the Muslims in the South' and reception for displaced perso was part of this strategy: the Ithe NIF', and 'food is used Islam', 30 An even harsher ana Sudan Council of Churches mirteeen member churches.31 ne service of the NIF which Samize the South. He said th in the Islamic hands which are policy was part of a broader a in fill the vacuum' motivate

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#### Criticisms of Islamist use of humanitarian aid

In Khartoum, there were many criticisms of the Islamist control over aid, voiced sometimes by the staff of international NGOs and often by Christian Sudanese organizations, which vigorously denounced the close collaboration between the government authorities and Islamic organizations. In an interview conducted in 1996 in Khartoum, Toby Maduot, president of the Sudan Democratic Forum and the Society Dinka Rek, painted a picture of the Islamic NGOs as surrogates for the governmental policy of the North, serving the interests of the 'war against non-Muslims in the South' and working to convert them. For him, the policy of reception for displaced persons in the camps set up in the outskirts of Khartoum was part of this strategy: the Islamic agencies put the displaced persons 'at the mercy of the NIF', and 'food is used as a weapon to convert as many people as possible to Islam'. 30 An even harsher analysis was given to me by the secretary-general of the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC), a federal institution set up in 1967 with some thirteeen member churches.<sup>31</sup> According to Rev. Enoch Tombe, the NGOs were in the service of the NIF which sought to prolong the war in order to be able to islamize the South. He said that 'Christian communities are bound to lose members in the Islamic hands which are protected by the government'. According to him, the policy was part of a broader aim, the islamization of Africa, deriving from a duty to to fill the vacuum' motivated by the strong assumption that 'Africans have no religion and are pagans'.32

External observers have also emphasized the practice of islamization and its political aims. Some have taken sides and become spokesmen for the sufferings of the Christians, as in the case of Jacques Monnot's book, whose very title, The drama of South Sudan: Chronicle of a forced islamization, is expressive (Monnot 1994). For Abdou Maliqalim Simone, the policy of 1991-2 consisted of dislodging the displaced populations from their temporary residence in Khartoum to put them in camps in the outskirts of the capital, 'providing special food relief and employment to those converting to Islam' (Simone 1994: 68), and this was due to the regime's fear of seeing an Africanization of Khartoum develop. As for Donald Petterson, United States ambassador to Khartoum between 1992 and 1994, he was able to observe on various occasions the alignment of certain NGOs with government policy. Petterson was allowed to fly to the 'transition zone' between North and South. On 27 September 1993 he went to Malakal (500 miles south of Khartoum) where there were 95,000 displaced persons with nothing but their clothes, some very sick. He noted that there were no international NGOs present and that 'the area in the vicinity of the town had been divided into five parts, each of which was the responsibility of one of the five Sudanese NGOs working there'. He reports that a local official whispered to him that 'the Islamic NGOs (four of the five NGOs at Malakal) were using relief supplies as a tool to Islamize people in the camps' Petterson 1999: 31).

On the question of islamization, it is not always easy to distinguish between the forced and the voluntary conversions. Thorough field research with the recipients of aid would be needed to better understand their relations with the various different aid providers, after the model of Barbara Harrell-Bond's pioneering study which showed how aid is sometimes imposed on beneficiaries (Harrell-Bond 1986). The

extreme sensitivity of the issue could lead to special difficulties for any research, who was outside the aid system.

I experienced this myself in 1996 when I asked to visit the Jabal Awliva camp, 171 of the main camps for displaced persons (along with another, Dar as-Salam) on and outskirts of Khartoum. It was Abdallah Suleyman al-'Awad (of whom more be... who arranged this. After a delay required to get leave to make the journey, I ler-Saturday 11 May 1996 to visit the camp in a 4 by 4 car belonging to the Islam. African Relief Agency and driven by one of their staff. We were accompanied by . young state employee, responsible for the coordination of Khartoum refugees, with was to play his part well in representing the authorities. When I prepared to the some photographs on arrival at the camp, he intervened and stopped me taker. them, saying he had orders to do so, though I had an authority to take photograz: and a press card obtained from the Ministry of Culture. Families were surviving temporary tents during very hot weather, totally dependent on humanitar... organizations, some Sudanese (Da'wa Islamiya, IARA, Sudanese Red Crescent SUDRA, Sudan Council of Churches) but three of them Islamic international agencies (Muwaffaq, IIRO and Africa Muslim Agency), as well as MSF Hollist. which was mainly concerned with sanitation. Everything seemed to be done prevent me from meeting any staff of Christian agencies, of whom it was said ±. they did not work on Saturdays. I visited the clinics and feeding centres run by IAF. and Da'wa Islamiya, and talked with their staff.

The IARA administrator in the camp explained to me that his organization i. not set out to practice da'wa. But when we discussed a particular given project. became clear that things were not quite so clear-cut. For instance, in order confront the scourge of AIDS which was spreading in the camp, IARA had put a place a programme of prevention by means of the distribution of condoms supp\_== by the World Health Organization. But there was a problem with lack of stocks. To distribution of condoms was not the only means of prevention. The administrative emphasized the importance of getting across a message about sound more whether through the help of religious leaders, or more directly in the case of the second sec 'without religion' - by which was meant the 'animists'. Thus material aid :: accompanied by an educational dimension. This was also to be found in IARprogrammes to dissuade displaced persons from practising female excision. practice specially common among those who came from Kordofan and Darfur.33 E. what did the beneficiaries think? I had no idea: when I asked to speak with some the inmates in the camp, I was told that we were short of time, and we got back at in the car and returned to Khartoum. Even if I had been allowed to sound out =: opinions of the displaced persons in the camp, they would probably have hesitate. to speak in the presence of their aid suppliers.

The question of the political and religious use of aid must be considered in context. Often, Islamic NGOs are denounced by other organizations that do nowish to be marginalized. Among others, the Sudan Council of Churches (SC complained about the contrast between the privileges given by the state to Islamiorganizations and the obstacles put in the way of organizations linked to the SC such as SUDRA and SUDANAID.<sup>34</sup> But this denunciation derived from the strategof an organization that was suffering from not being allowed to implement its commissionary programme freely. The constitution of the Sudan Council of Church:

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Sometimes, the aid providers of political matters. Thus, after the atternation in Addis Ababa in June 1995. Thich was under suspicion of serving. Islamist orientation. Furthermore rever to these activities. For instance monstrate a 'Khartoum connection the people arrested by the Ethiopic reganization Muwaffaq al-Kheiriya. Awsuit against Africa Confidential. In manager of the organization, Sirage imphasized its international and hur whartoum regime a United Nations:

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ained to me that his organization 2. iscussed a particular given project. clear-cut. For instance, in order eading in the camp, IARA had put .the distribution of condoms supr\_=: as a problem with lack of stocks. ans of prevention. The administrative ss a message about sound more or more directly in the case of these e 'animists'. Thus material aid ... his was also to be found in IARfrom practising female excision. me from Kordofan and Darfur. 32 when I asked to speak with some re short of time, and we got back .-I had been allowed to sound out =: they would probably have hesitate.

ise of aid must be considered in by other organizations that do a Sudan Council of Churches (SCI vileges given by the state to Islam: of organizations linked to the SCI nunciation derived from the strates being allowed to implement its confirm the Sudan Council of Churches

provided in fact for the organization 'to assist the members of the Churches in the extension of God's Kingdom by spreading the Good News of Salvation'.<sup>35</sup>

Sometimes, the aid providers found themselves at the heart of international political matters. Thus, after the attempt on the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak's life in Addis Ababa in June 1995, the spotlight turned to the Khartoum regime, which was under suspicion of serving as a rear base for international 'terrorism' with an Islamist orientation. Furthermore, some aid suppliers were suspected of giving cover to these activities. For instance, the newsletter Africa Confidential sought to demonstrate a 'Khartoum connection', noting in its issue for 7 July 1995 that one of the people arrested by the Ethiopian authorities was a Sudanese working for the organization Muwaffaq al-Kheiriya, described as a 'NIF agency'. This resulted in a lawsuit against Africa Confidential. Interviewed in Khartoum in 1996, the executive manager of the organization, Sirag Al-Din Abdul Bari, denied the allegations and emphasized its international and humanitarian character. But this episode cost the Khartoum regime a United Nations resolution.

After the attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in August 1998, Sudan was again singled out: the United States launched a missile on a medicine factory on the outskirts of Khartoum. However, with time there has been progress towards normalization. To prove its engagement in the 'war against terrorism' after the 11 September 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, the Sudanese government submitted a detailed report in December 2001 to the Counter-Terrorism Committee set up under Resolution 1373 (2001) of the UN Security Council. Annexed to the report is a letter from the President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, addressed on the day of the attacks to his American counterpart, George W. Bush, to remind him that 'we strongly condemn all acts of terrorism, reaffirming our willingness to cooperate with vou, and the international community, to combat all acts of terrorism'. The Sudanese authorities set out in this 47 page document the measures taken by them to combat 'terrorism', their close cooperation with the American government services, and the results of an enquiry conducted by the Sudanese Central Bank, rebutting the allegation that Usama bin Laden was a founder and shareholder of Al-Shamal Islamic Bank, a leading Islamic financial institution in Sudan.<sup>38</sup> Thus with time, Sudan's signs of conduct seem to have paid off. Hassan al-Turabi's marginalization seems to have been enough to give the appearance of a less Islamist regime, even though some major figures in the movement remain in key posts. The image of Sudan has changed, and criticism has become less virulent.

#### Humanitarian politics and pragmatism win out over ideological differences

In order to help us escape the ready-made binary opposition of 'Western/Christian' and 'Islamic', three points may be made in conclusion. First, competition has been intense between the groups and movements presenting themselves as legitimate representatives of a correct conception of Islam. This considerable diversity has been reflected in competition between Islamic aid organizations. The rivalry between the partisans of Sadiq al-Mahdi's Umma party and the Hassan al-Turabi tendency has continued to intensify. When the officials of the Umma party lost hope of influence over Da'wa Islamiya or the IARA after the June 1989 coup, they founded another charitable organization. In an interview carried out in March 1997 for the well-informed study published by African Rights, Nasr al-Din al-Hadi al-Mahdi, of

the Umma party, spoke of the recent foundation of the Sudanese Communi-Islamic Relief Organization, based in Saudi-Arabia. The Umma party thus hoped redirect the donations of Sudanese expatriates, including zakat contributions. For offering them an alternative to the Islamic organizations working in the zone controlled by the Sudanese NIF (African Rights 1997: 195-6).

A second point is that, as well as confrontation, some processes of cooperation even of hybridization, may be observed. A striking case is the strategies implementably the Islamic [African] Relief Agency (IARA-ISRA), based in Khartoum. For IARA-ISRA, the search for support from NGOs and international organization began in the 1980s. The career of Abdallah Suleyman al-'Awad, the founder, later chairman of the agency, is an example of hybridization. A medical doctor by training and a militant Islamist, he was for many years employed in Alexandria at the East Mediterranean Regional Office of the World Health Organization. As he explained himself in an interview conducted in 1996, this position enabled him to assimilate the culture of an international organization and appreciate all the advantages international NGOs. At the same time, giving some humanitarian legitimacy to international NGOs. At the same time, giving some humanitarian legitimacy to international neabled it to avoid the accusations that were directed against Date organization enabled it to avoid the accusations that were directed against Date organization and political purposes.

Declaring that he preferred 'field dialogue' to 'intellectual dialogue between Islam and Christianity', Abdallah Suleyman al-'Awad tried from early on to convince Christian or Western agencies to work with him, reminding them that as Christians they wanted to help the poor, just as Muslims wanted to help the poor.<sup>39</sup> Seeking: implement the idea of twinning with international NGOs, the IARA worked partnership on specific projects with agencies such as World Vision, the Luthersc Federation, Oxfam, ADRA and MSF Holland. It proved more difficult, according : al-'Awad, to work with the French MSF. Sometimes, IARA obtained public funding For instance, in 1998 the Islamic American Relief Agency (also using inabbreviation IARA), a sister agency of the Sudanese one, was awarded two grantfrom the US Agency for International Development (USAID), totalling \$4.2 million for projects in Mali. (In December 1999, the US State Department decided : suspend this grant in the context of investigation into the armed attacks in 1993 : the World Trade Center and in 1998 against the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar as-Salaam. The director of IARA-USA stated in his defence that his agencregistered since 1984 in Columbia, Missouri, had nothing to do with Sudan and haz never been accused of activities linked to 'terrorism'. He announced his intention: appeal against the decision.)40

Furthermore, having been granted consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council (UNECOSOC), IARA worked with UN agencies such as the High Commissioner for Refugees or Unicef. Finally, al-'Awad played a key role of enabling his agency to become an active member of international NGO forums. He helped found the Forum of African Voluntary and Development Organization (FAVDO) in Dakar and was vice-president for a time. Proud of having enabled of Third World organization' to be admitted to the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in Geneva, he became a member of ICVA's executive council of 1986 and vice-chairman in 1990.

A third point: what may be calle reanization can lead it, perhaps Position with regard to the Islam: LARA-ISRA) distanced itself from vicies made fund-raising for the E-mingham in 1996, Abdul Sarnac tranch, told the following story to account of all that was being sai arristians in Sudan. Summers, wi Inurch on a visit to Bosnia to eval restions of devout Christians wh Secan: about the massacres of Chr ind about children captured in the nverted. Following this exchange. stay in Khartoum to raise the man and enquired of the general, what aplained that he had to work with a injected to discrimination in Sudar. In conclusion, though many di ims of humanitarian aid, the elem Whatever the principles justify:

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A third point: what may be called the transition to humanitarianism of an Islamist organization can lead it, perhaps unexpectedly, to adopt a pragmatic and critical position with regard to the Islamist project. Thus, ISRA-UK (the UK branch of IARA-ISRA) distanced itself from the Khartoum regime because the regime's policies made fund-raising for the humanitarian agency difficult. Interviewed in Birmingham in 1996, Abdul Samad Summers, manager of the organization's British branch, told the following story to illustrate the prejudice felt against his agency on account of all that was being said in the media about the predicament of the Christians in Sudan. Summers, while accompanying an official of the Methodist Church on a visit to Bosnia to evaluate a joint project in Tuzla, had to reply to the questions of devout Christians who were concerned by information coming from Sudan: about the massacres of Christian priests, about Christian believers crucified, and about children captured in the South of Sudan, taken to the North and forcibly converted. Following this exchange, Abdul Samad Summers took the opportunity of a stay in Khartoum to raise the matter with a Sudanese army general. He said that he had enquired of the general, what was all this about people being crucified? He explained that he had to work with different groups worldwide: if the Churches were subjected to discrimination in Sudan, it raised a serious problem for fund-raising.

In conclusion, though many differences may be identified between different forms of humanitarian aid, the element of pragmatism seems to be common to them all. Whatever the principles justifying a project, it can only be realized if it gets support. Like their Christian or Western equivalents, Islamic relief agencies must bow to the rules of communication and marketing.